681, Discussion Questions, Challenges to Democratic Citizenship

 

IV. Democratic Theory and Mass Political Sophistication: Challenges to Democratic Citizenship

  1. Review Kinder, “Attitude and Action in the Realm of Politics,” Challenges to Democratic Citizenship.
  2. Skim: Philip Converse. 1964. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter. (Summarized in Kinder’s chapter, but a classic, “brussel sprouts” reading in this area.) 
  3. John Zaller and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions or Revealing Preferences?" American Journal of Political Science, 36(3): 579-616. (Focus on the theory and the Summary & Discussion; skim the analysis [pp. 587-606]). (On the findings, see Ansolabehere et al. 2008. APSR, below)
  4. Stephen Ansolabehere et al. 2008 APSR. The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting. 215-232.
  5. James Kuklinski, et al. 2000. “Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship.” Journal of Politics, 62: 790-816. (It’s not just a lack of information that’s worrisome.)
  6. Sullivan, et al. 1993. “Why Politicians are More Tolerant:  Selective Recruitment and Socialization among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand, and the United States,” British Journal of Political Science, 23: 51-76.
  7. James L. Gibson. 2008. “Intolerance and Political Repression in the US: A Half Century After McCarthy.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, Pp. 96–108.
  8. Marc Hutchison and Douglas Gibler. 2007. “Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A Cross-National Study.” Journal of Politics, (2007), 69 : 128-142.(skim)

            Additional Readings:

 

 

Philip Converse. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent.

1.   A classic: the advantage of being first.

2.   Why should anyone care about the structure of mass belief systems or ideological thinking among the public? What are the normative, analytical, and practical benefits? How does Converse evaluate the competence of the ordinary citizen? Do you agree with his position? Why or why not?

3.   How does Converse define such things as ideology, belief systems, and ideological constraint? How are these terms, especially ideological or attitude constraint, measured? What three types of ideological constraint does Converse discuss? How would you evaluate Converse’s measure of attitude constraint?

4.   What about completely different methods of evaluating mass belief systems, such as depth interviews of a much smaller number of respondents?

Zaller and Feldman, "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response…”

1.     This is a classic and heavily cited article that seeks to provide a new theory of the survey response and, in the process, provides something of a compromise between two views on response stability by Converse (errors are in respondents) and Achen (errors are in measures). In developing their theory of the survey response, Zaller and Feldman distinguish between explanations of response instability by Converse and Achen.  What are the differences between these two explanations and the problems with each? In what ways does Zaller and Feldman’s model agree with and yet depart from each of these two explanations?

2.     Achen: using Classic, true attitude theory that assumes the only source of error in measures is random measurement error, so low correlations between observed measures over time or across measures of the same construct must attenuate true correlations.  When “correct” for this attenuation, stability coefficients are close to 1.0.  Over-correction. Non-random measurement error may inflate correlations. 

3.     What are the three axioms of Zaller and Feldman’s theory of the survey response and where do they come from?

a)    Extrapolation of 3 simple axioms from an avalanche of research in political science & psychology.  High in parsimony; lower in predictive accuracy when predicting individual behavior. 

4.     What are some of the broader implications of the theory for the way public opinion should be studied, for studying response stability, persuasion, and democracy? Are survey responses “real,” or just epiphenomenal constructions? How malleable or fixed is public opinion?

5.     Interestingly, some analysts have taken Z&F’s theory of the survey response as a model of how citizens form their opinions in the real world, not just in an interview. Is this reasonable? How does the model help to put the political environment and “politics” back into the study of public opinion? 

6.     Questions to ponder now and later:

a)    Pick an issue on which public opinion has moved or hasn’t moved and do your best to apply this theory to explain public opinion on this issue.

b)    How might you critique this theory? Does it have enough axioms? Do the deductions follow directly from the axioms?  Can it be tested rigorously? Can it be falsified?  

c)   How does the model help explanation issue framing by elites? What implications does the model have for the fluidity of building coalitions of support or opposition among the public? What implications does the model have for helping to explain media influence on public opinion?

d)    The model, which is admittedly sparse, borrows selectively from theories of information processing, attitude change, framing and so on.  If one advantage of the model is parsimony, what are some of the costs of relying on this more abbreviated model? More generally, what are some of the major problems with the model, as you see them, both theoretically and in its application?

 

Ansolabehere et al. 2008. APSR. The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting.” 215-232.

Here are a few questions for the Ansolabehere article, which takes on many of the conventional wisdoms that grew out of Converse’s 1964 chapter:

  1. The subtitle of this article should be, “Can you hear me now? ‘A simple approach to measurement error’!!”   Why hasn’t the conventional wisdom (as reflected in textbooks and Kinder’s summary) about the stability and importance of issue attitudes been reconciled with research findings in this area? How do the authors hope to “break through” where others have failed in the past? 
  2. What is the “simple approach to measurement error” that the authors promote?  How different is this approach from those used in past research to deal with measurement error?
  3. What are the major methodological and substantive implications of this study?
  4. What can we say about models of the heterogeneity of policy attitudes, like Converse’s Black & White model, and more recent studies (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Goren 1997) simulating behavioral differences in low and high knowledge (or education) groups? 

 

James Kuklinski, et al. 2000. “Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship.”

1.   What is the difference between being uninformed and being misinformed and what are the implications for democracy? 

2.   What are the implications of the authors’ findings on misinformation and their attempts to correct it for citizen sophistication?

3.   Are welfare attitudes unique? Can the authors’ findings be applied to other policy attitudes? What kinds of beliefs are most resistant to change?

 

Sullivan, et al. 1993. “Why Politicians are More Tolerant..”

1.   What is political tolerance, how is it different from social intolerance, and why is it important to study?

2.   Do you think it is more, less or just as important to study in the U.S. today as it was in the 1950s, during the McCarthy era?

3.   What implicit normative assumptions (e.g., about the priority attached to the value of political tolerance versus other values) are being made by the authors and to what extent are these standards applicable to other countries? 

4.   To what extent is political intolerance among the mass public a serious threat to democracy? 

5.   Are some forms of political intolerance less dangerous than others or is there a single normative standard of “pure” tolerance? Are people who express political intolerance undemocratic? What about the “paradox of intolerance”?

6.   Why are politicians more tolerant, why doesn’t Israel fit the pattern, and what does this say about democratic theories and the role of elites?

7.   Are other explanations possible?

8.   How do the authors use survey experiments to investigate the pliability of tolerance attitudes?

9.   What more do you think should be done here?

 

James L. Gibson. 2007. “Intolerance and Political Repression in the US: A Half Century After McCarthy.”

1.   Gibson’s study of post-9/11 political tolerance in the U.S. raises a number of questions about the antecedents and consequences of tolerance today.

2.   What is pluralistic intolerance? 

3.   Evaluate Gibson’s evidence for his conclusion that “the theory of pluralistic intolerance must be reconceptualized to acknowledge that even unfocused intolerance can create a culture of conformity that discourages those with unpopular views from asserting themselves politically.”

4.   Are the different survey periods comparable? How might the question wording and the psychological context influence responses to the same questions about perceptions of personal freedoms over time?

 

Marc Hutchison and Douglas Gibler. 2007. “Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A Cross-National Study.

1.   What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Hutchison and Gibler study?

2.   What does it contribute to the study of political tolerance?